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CASES NOTED
was an entity distinct from its members 22 and that the partnership papers
were therefore the property of the firm, the court re-examines the fundamental
nature of the partnership relation as contrasted with that of the corporation
or unincorporated association, and holds that papers of the small family
partnership here involved belong to the partners as tenants in common. In
accepting the aggregate theory of partnership, the court is in accord with the
view of the jurisdictions which adopt the definition of partnership set forth
in the Uniform Partnership Law.23 Jn holding that the papers and books
subpoenaed are the property of each of the partners and that to compel their
production upon serving only one partner constitutes an unreasonable search
and seizure of the property of the others, the decision is in accord with early
Supreme Court cases holding that the compulsory production of one's private
papers for use in criminal proceedings is compelling him to be a witness against
himself and is equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure within the
24
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
As the determination of what is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
is a judicial question 23 to be determined by the facts and circumstances of
each case, 26 this decision may not be considered a binding precedent in the
case of a large unincorporated association, e.g., a labor union, or, possibly,
partnerships of large numbers, or partnerships in which there are special
and limited as well as general partners. Such large bodies may be considered
more analogous to corporations than to individuals, or small family partnerships, in which case the Fourth Amendment will not be as liberally construed
in their favor.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-GRANTING OF ANNULMENT OR SUPPORT
WHERE PARTIES HAVE UNCLEAN HANDS
Petitioner, second husband of respondent, sought an annulment on
grounds of respondent's prior subsisting marriage. Petitioner had knowledge
prior to marriage to respondent that the divorce decree obtained by respondent's first husband was of the Mexican mail-order variety and void for
want of jurisdiction. In the lower court, respondent's counter-claim for support for herself and the child of the disputed marriage was allowed, but the
petitioner's request for annulment was denied. Held, on appeal, that the
22. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913); Horner v. Hamner, 249 Fed. 134
(C. C. A. 4th 1918) (under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, a partnership is treated as a
distinct entity).

23. UNIoRM PARTRsnip ACT § 6(1) ; Abbott v. Anderson, 265

782 (1914)

(a partnership is not an entity distinct from its members).

111. 285, 106 N. E.

24. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 132 (1921); Boyd v. United States, ssprg.
25. United States v. Vatune, 292 U. S. 497 (1923).
26. Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d 881 (C. C. A. 8th 1925) ; Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
parties are in pari delicto. Petitioner may not attack the .validity of the marriage because in equity he has "unclean hands," and the award of alimony is
reversed since respondent failed to carry the burden of proof of a valid
marriage. Tonti v. Chadwick, 64 A.2d 436 (New Jersey 1949).
A petitioner may not come into a court of equity with "unclean hands"
since equity will not grant relief to one who has conducted himself in an
unconscionable manner as to known facts.1 This rule has been applied in suits
for annulment, 2 and the principle upheld by the analogous rules of estoppel
in separation and support, 3 and recrimination in divorce cases.4 But, as to
persons seeking decrees of annulment of void marriages, there is a split of
authority on applying the "unclean hands" doctrine.
The English view,6 followed by some American courts, 6 is that where a
marriage is void ab initio, knowledge (by the petitioner) of an obstacle to a
7
valid marriage is no defense, since a marriage is not an ordinary contract,
and the public interest is best served by determining the status of the parties. 8
Thus, consideration is given to the welfare of children born of void marriages
by leaving the parties free to remarry and establish a normal home.
The contrary view, 9 taken by the principal case, is that equitable relief
cannot be granted to one who acts with knowledge10 of his wrongdoing. In
denying relief to the guilty actor, bigamous marriages are discouraged, and
women who enter into such marriages in good faith are protected from those
who would take advantage of their plight." However, it is difficult to perceive how the woman can be protected without also enforcing the ooligation
to support.
1. Brown v. Brown, 66 Conn. 493, 34 Atl. 490 (1895); Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
American Can Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 387, 67 Atl. 339 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907).
2. Ewald v, Ewald, 219 Mass. 111, 106 N. E. 567 (1914); Tyll v. Keller. 94 N. J.
Eq. 426, 120 Atl. 6 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923) ; Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc. 492, 174 N. Y.
Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp.
566 (1st Dep't 1917); theory applied sub silentio in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 219 App.
Div. 344. 220 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dep't 1927).
3. Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 356, 26 N. E.2d 290 (1940) ; Senor v. Senor, 70

N. Y. S.2d 909 (1947).
4. Derby v. Derby, 21 N, J. Eq. 36 (Ch. 1870); Pease v. Pease, 72 Wis. 136, 39
N. W. 133 (1888) ; see Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N. W 160 (1882) (where the
analogy between recrimination and "unclean hands" was set out).
5. Miles v. Chilton, 1 Rob. Eec. 683, 163 Eng. Rep. 1178 (Consistory Court of
London 1849).

6. Davis v. Green, 91 N. J. Eq. 17, 108 AtI. 772 (Ch. 1919); Freda v. Bergman,
77 N. J. Eq. 46, 76 Atl. 460 (Ch. 1910).

7. Freda v. Berginan, supra.
8. Davis v. Green, supra.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. The court relied on Watkinson v. Watkinson, 67 N. J. Eq. 142, 58 At. 384
(Ch. 1904), where it was said that the burden imposed on the proposed new spouse is
the same as that imposed on a purchaser of land. Cf. Stokes v. Stokes, 198 N. Y. 301,
91 N. E. 793 (1910) ; Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 618, 21 N. E. 106 (1889) (where the first
spouse was alive at the time of remarriage the duty of inquiry was placed solely on the
party remarrying).
11, Tyll v. Keller, supra; Kaufman v. Kaufman, supra; 19 ST. JoHN's L. REv, 153
(1945).

CASES NOTED
In an analogous situation, a defendant was estopped to deny the validity
of his Nevada divorce and the estoppel entitled his second "wife," by the
otherwise void marriage, to separation and support. 12 However, the doctrine
of estoppel has never been invoked to prevent one who married with knowledge of the spouse's Mexican mail-order divorce from obtaining a divorce
based on the prior-subsisting marriage,'3 since public policy is opposed to
giving any substance to a decree obtained in this manner. 14 Nor does the
"unclean hands" doctrine imply a duty to support, since its only function is
to deny relief to the guilty actor. In the instant case, by finding the parties
to be in pari delicto, the question of support is sidestepped and the desirable
result of protecting women in such cases is not attained.
The court in the instant case, in applying the doctrine of "unclean
hands," failed to determine the status of the parties. While, in an action for
divorce, application of the similar doctrine of recrimination leaves the
parties married, and in an action to annul a voidable marriage, application
of "unclean hands" leaves the parties married, it is not clear what the status
of the parties is, where it is contended that the marriage was void. An indication that the parties here are not married is a lower court ruling that the
respondent's correct name was that of her first husband.' 5 Even stronger is
the view, set out in Rooney v. Rooney,"6 that whether or not a decree of
nullity is issued a bigamous marriage has no binding effect for any purpose.
Thus it appears that the petitioner in the principal case escapes all of the
obligations of the marriage contract and suffers only the loss of any benefits
which might result from a decree of nullity, 17 removing any doubt as to his
status.
The effect of this decision upon respondent seems punitive in view of the
circumstances. For, even though she would not have been entitled to alimony
under the New Jersey statute 8 had the annulment been granted, she would
have been aided in collecting her damages, if any. 19 Further, it is necessary, from a sociological aspect, to determine the status of the parties, since
12. Krause v. Krause, supra.
13. Note, 62 ARy. L. REv. 131 (1949).

14. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146, 81 N. E.2d 60 (19); Querze v. Querze,
290 N. Y. 13, 47 N. E2d 423 (1943); Vose v. Vose, 280 N. Y. 779, 21 N. E2d 616
(1939).
15. Compare the principal case tith Miles v.Chilton, supra.
16. See 54 N. J. Eq. 231, 34 Atl. 682, 686 (Ch. 1896) ; accord, Krause v.Krause,
supra at 360, 26 N. E.2d at 292.
17. Rooney v. Rooney, supra note 16 (the decree of nullity works an estoppel which
prevents the question of fact, out of which the nullity arose, from being raised again).
18. N. J. REv. STAT. § 2:50-1 (1937), Wigder v. Wigder, 14 N. J. Misc. 880, 188
At. 235 (Ch. 1936).
. 19. Sclanberg v. Sclanberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N. E.2d 801 (1942) (niece who
helped reduce uncle's indebtedness during their void marriage entitled to $1,000);
Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal.2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937) (where marriage was annulled on basis of wife's prior marriage and wife would have had grounds for divorce had
the marriage been valid, wife was awarded $1,250 for services during time they lived
together).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
it is the responsibility of a domestic relations court to deal with the family
as a unit, Included in this unit is the child, who is always the loser, no matter
who succeeds in the suit, where the home is broken. In the instant case the
20
court dismisses its duty to the child by pointing to the New Jersey statute
which provides support and legitimacy to the child in such cases. But it did
not consider that a child needs a normal and secure home, which it cannot
attain unless the status of the parties is determined with the consequent
freedom safely to remarry.
There were three problems of public policy involved in the principal
case: first, the utterly void character of the Mexican decree to which the
court could not give substance; second. protection of women in this situation
from men who act in bad faith, by enforcing the obligation to support:
third, the determination of the status of the parties. A satisfactory disposition was made only of the first point. Both the first and third points could
have been properly settled had the court granted an annulment, but the second
point could only be properly disposed of by granting alimony to respondent
and under prevailing statutes in New Jersey this could not be done. It would
appear that the best available results could have been obtained by granting
the annulment, but that equity cannot be fully served in such cases without
statutes which allow alimony in suits for annulment, in the discretion of the
2
court. '

LIENS-UNRECORDED CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT INFERIOR
TO MECHANIC'S LIEN
Plaintiff, assignee of a conditional sales contract on which the buyer
had defaulted, sought possession of an automobile from defendant, a mechanic
who had commenced work on the automobile at the direction of the buyer after
the execution of the conditional sales contract but prior to its recordation
as required by statute.1 The trial court first directed a verdict for plaintiff,
and then issued an order for a new trial. On appeal, held, order affirmed. A
mechanic who repairs an automobile without notice of an unrecorded conditional sales contract has a lien superior to that of the conditional seller.
G. F.C. Corp. v.Spradlin, 38 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1949).
20. N. J. Rav. STAT. § 9:15-2 (1937).
21. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. Acr § 1140-a, Johnson v. Johnson, 270 App. Div. 811, 59 N. Y.
S.2d 698 (2d Dep't 1946) (vhere the bigamous wife was awarded alimony under the
New York statute, though she was the sole wrongdoer).
I

FLA.

STAT.

§ 319.15 (1941)

("No liens

.

. .

as security

.

. .

on a conditional bill

of sale . . . on a motor vehicle . . . shall be enforceable in any of the courts of this

state, against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration, without
notice. unless a sworn notice of such lien . . . be recorded . , . shall be effective as
constructive notice when filed ... ").

